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Democratic leaders are more prone to domestic sanction following defeats, and these audience costs allow
democracies to signal their intentions during public disputes. Empirical tests strongly support this relationship;
however, recent criticisms have questioned whether the causal mechanisms of audience costs are responsible for
these findings. We provide a unified rationale for why both arguments are correct: democracies rarely contend over
territorial issues, a consistently salient and contentious issue. Without these issues, leaders are unable to generate
audience costs but are able to choose easy conflicts. Our reexaminations of threat-based and reciprocation-based
studies support this argument. We also present tests of within-dispute behavior using MID incident data, which
confirms that the salience of territory matters more than regime type when predicting militarized behavior. Any
regime differences suggest a disadvantage for democratic challengers over territorial issues, and any peace between
democracies results from the dearth of salient issues involving these regimes.
W
hen leaders are able to make public
announcements and risk their tenure as
leader, the credibility of their threats and
actions should increase. Knowing that the leader is
risking their domestic political future informs the rival
about the challenger’s resolve. One of the most ef-
fective and consistent means of punishing leaders
for policy failure is an election; regularized elections
aggregate domestic opinion quickly and in a low-cost
way for the domestic audience. Because elections
are contentious and regularized in democracies, their
leaders are more vulnerable to domestic sanction
than autocratic leaders, and this gives democratic
leaders an advantage when bargaining internationally
with other leaders. Uncertainty is diminished when two
democracies bargain against each other, and this pro-
vides a coherent explanation for why democracies do
not fight each other but still bargain well with non-
democratic leaders (Fearon 1994; Schultz 2001a).
Though audience costs are difficult to identify
empirically (Schultz, 2001b), a large body of research
has noted that democratic challenges are not often
reciprocated by their rivals (see, for example, Gelpi
and Griesdorf 2001; Schultz 2001a; Weeks 2008).
This lack of reciprocation is supposed to denote the
rival’s understanding that the challenge is indeed
credible. Recent criticisms have called this argument
into question, however. Examining the actual threats
made by leaders, Snyder and Borghard (2011) and
Downes and Sechser (2012) note that few disputes or
crises follow the explanations provided by audience
cost logic (see, also, Trachtenberg 2012), and sys-
tematic examinations demonstrate that the threats
made by democratic leaders are not often successful
(Downes and Sechser 2012). This leads to an em-
pirical puzzle: why are the challenges of democratic
leaders so successful when their threats during
conflicts rarely are?
We argue that the answer rests in the relationship
between democracies and the types of issues they are
most likely to face. Democracies tend to cluster together
in peace (Gleditsch 2002), democracies are unlikely to
fight other democracies (Russett and Oneal 2001), and
the conflicts that democracies do escalate rarely involve
their own territories (Gibler and Miller 2013). These
empirical patterns suggest that democracies face few
direct threats to their homeland, and this makes sit-
uations in which audience costs matter both exceed-
ingly rare and more easily manipulable by the leader.
Safe in peaceful environments, democratic publics tend
to care more about their economies and taxes rather
than conflicts abroad that have little direct effect on the
average citizen. Foreign policy reversals (or steadfastness)
become inconsequential during either good or bad
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economic times. Thus, when a democratic leader issues
a threat during a foreign policy crisis, it is unlikely that
the public will care enough about the issue to generate
audience costs during the crisis. However, because the
democratic leader is sheltered fromdirect threats, she or
he has the ability to avoid potential losses and instead
initiate disputes only when there is a high likelihood of
winning the issue. This is why democracies perform
poorly when threatening other states yet so few of their
challenges are ever reciprocated, and this explanation
has far-reaching implications for theories of the dem-
ocratic peace.
We begin the article by discussing, briefly, the im-
portance of audience costs for democratic peace theory
and the empirical puzzle surrounding it. We then
describe the salience of territorial issues and their
relationship with democratic regimes. We argue that
the development of democracy may actually be tied
to the removal of territorial issues from the state, in
part, because the evidence is so strong that democracies
seldom face threats to their homeland territories. We
follow two paths to test our argument. First, we re-
examine previous threat-based and reciprocation-based
research designs, demonstrating how the introduction
of territorial threats in these analyses can make better
sense of democratic conflict behavior. Then, we discuss
the implications of our argument for within-dispute
bargaining, using Fearon’s (1994) expectations as base-
line hypotheses. Providing some of the first-ever anal-
yses of the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) Incident
data, we find that democracies seldom have an advan-
tage over other types of states when bargaining over
territorial issues. We close by arguing that these findings
suggest audience costs cannot be a general explanation
of the democratic peace but instead support the con-
tention that democracies rarely face contentious issues
between them.1
Do Democracies Signal Credibly?
When leaders hold private information regarding
their capabilities and resolve, cooperation becomes
challenging. State leaders have incentives to bluff about
their capabilities or resolve in order to coerce greater
concessions from the other actor. Therefore, the ability
to differentiate between cheap talk and credible infor-
mation becomes critically important both to avoid losses
and to win concessions in international bargaining.
While leaders can often deduce reliable assessments of
opposing capabilities, understanding an opponents’ re-
solve is more difficult. How does one distinguish be-
tween a leader who is bluffing and one who is resolved
to carry through with their threat?
Originating with Schelling’s (1960) discussion of
credible commitments, audience costs are the domestic
penalties (e.g., removal from office) that leaders will
likely suffer if they back down from a public threat
during an international crisis or dispute (Fearon 1994).
The added cost associated with backing down adds
credibility to leader threats, thereby providing an in-
formative signal to their adversaries. These audience
costs have been used to explain a variety of interna-
tional interactions, but most studies have focused on
the ability of democratic leaders to signal their inten-
tions. In this argument, since democracies have insti-
tutions that both publicize policies and offer citizens a
means of checking leaders (mostly, elections), democ-
racies have an advantage over other types of regimes in
their ability to remove from office any leader who backs
down. Ultimately, the increased constraints placed on
democratic leaders are understood as a general expla-
nation for why democracies do not fight each other
since informative democracies reduce the uncertainties
that could lead to war between them (Fearon 1994;
Schultz 2001a).
Eyerman and Hart (1996) were the first to em-
pirically test Fearon’s argument. Using a sample from
the SHERFACS conflict-management dataset and
employing multiple measures of democratic institu-
tions, their findings were consistent with the conflict
behavior expectations cited by Fearon (1994). Partell
and Palmer (1999) confirmed this finding using dispute
data and a revised coding of audience costs based on
executive constraints. Finally, Gelpi and Griesdorf
(2001) extended the argument even further by showing
that democracies that use violent bargaining methods—
the resolute audience-cost leaders—are more likely to
win international crises over leaders without audience-
cost constraints. In sum, early tests demonstrated
abundant support for the logic of audience costs, even
when using three very different datasets.
In two separate works, Schultz (1999; 2001a) in-
troduces a slightly different mechanism for why dem-
ocratic actions are more likely than other states to
be perceived as credible. The argument rests on the
strategic politics of democratic opposition parties.
Schultz argues that opposition parties provide checks
1All data used in this piece as well as the original replication
command files will be made available upon publication, via the
author’s Dataverse page at http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/
dmgibler. An online appendix also supports this article with an
explanation of several research design issues regarding the dispute
reciprocation analyses. That appendix can be found at http://
dmgibler.people.ua.edu/audience-costs.html. All errors remain
the responsibility of the authors.
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on the actions and statements of the leader. Opposition
parties that back the leader signal the resolve of the state,
while opposition parties that fail to support the leader
signal ambivalence or contention within the state.
In a politically competitive state, opposition parties try
to garner support and votes, so their position taking is
informative, and since democracies tend to be the only
states that have both active opposition parties and a
media system that advertises these platforms, democ-
racies will have a signaling advantage over other types
of states during crises. Schultz (2001a) confirms this
advantage by demonstrating that militarized disputes
initiated by democracies are less likely than other types
of disputes to be reciprocated; democratic leaders’
initiations are indeed credible. Weeks (2008) confirms
this finding and also extends the logic of the argument
to a limited set of nondemocracies with similar do-
mestic constraints.
Experimental evidence also suggests that audi-
ence costs may matter. Tomz (2007) embeds foreign
policy anecdotes in a survey experiment to determine
whether citizens would sanction a leader who backs
down. Finding that citizens care about the reputation
of their country’s leader, Tomz demonstrates that the
likelihood of political sanction increases with the level
of escalation described in the experiment. This pro-
vides some of the best evidence that citizens will favor
political sanction if their leaders were to back down
during important foreign policy crises. Levendusky
and Horowitz (2012) mitigate this evidence some-
what with their argument that the leader’s informa-
tional advantage over citizens offers a way to avoid
removal. According to their survey experiments, if
the leader told the public that new evidence came to
light during a crisis, then respondents were more likely
to view the leader as competent rather than weak for
backing down.
Despite this ample empirical support, recent re-
search has begun to question whether audience costs
really do exist for democratic leaders engaged in in-
ternational bargaining. Most notably, Downes and
Sechser (2012) argue that extant empirical tests of the
argument have used data that are wholly inappropriate
for testing the implications of audience-cost theories.
They argue, quite rightly, that dispute (and crisis) data
do not constitute threats made by leaders against their
rivals. Instead, the bulk of the conflict data identifies
low-level conflict and other types of disputes that rarely
include threats made by leaders to affect change. Second,
the conflicts captured with conflict data do not often
identify whether the threat actually changed rival be-
havior. Thus, for example, dispute reciprocation and
similar measures will not really capture whether
democracies’ leaders are successful in the threats they
make against other leaders.
To solve these problems, Downes and Sechser
(2012) develop a set of compellent threats which they
use to retest the Schultz (2001a) dispute-reciprocation
findings. Using the compellent-threat dataset, they find
that democracies have no audience-cost advantage over
other states, once the unit of analysis is the actual threat
made by the leader. They also examine the extension of
audience-cost logic made by Gelpi and Griesdorf (2001)
and find that democracies are no more or less likely
than other types of states to win their crises, again, once
compellent threats are properly identified. Their re-
search adds to the growing case-study evidence that
questions the real-world veracity of audience costs
(see, for example, Trachtenberg 2012).
More case-study evidence suggests that the world
just does not behave as audience-cost theories would
predict. Snyder and Borghard (2011), for example, argue
that leaders seldom make clear threats during crises,
preferring instead to allow flexibility in their offers when
bargaining. Leaders care about their international rep-
utations and do not wish to risk backing down in that
environment. They argue that these same reputations do
not matter, though, for domestic populations because
citizens care most about policy success during crises and
reputations for state strength and resolve that are in-
dependent of the leader. Finally, audience-cost theories
assume that nondemocratic rivals understand the me-
chanics of democratic governance, but Snyder and
Borghard (2011) argue that almost all leaders see rivals
as unitary actors and do not differentiate between leader
and public. They demonstrate their argument with
numerous case studies that suggest only secondary
support for audience costs, in only a few cases.2
The argument and findings in Downes and Sechser
(2012) and Snyder and Borghard (2011) call into ques-
tion one of the principle explanations for democratic
peace. However, left unexplained is why there has tra-
ditionally been so much large-N empirical support for
tests of the audience-cost logic. Again, we know that
democracies do not fight each other. We also have good
evidence that disputes initiated by democracies are not
often reciprocated, that citizens want to sanction leaders
who back down, and that democracies tend to bargain
2Brown and Marcum (2011) also provide an interesting critique of
the audience-cost logic. They argue that collective-action problems
should make it more difficult for democracies to remove leaders
over failed international policies. Smaller winning coalitions in
nondemocracies provide the advantage here, and their discussion
of the Cuban Missile Crisis provides support for their theory.
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well within disputes. So, why do Downes and Sechser
find such bleak results when testing actual threats?
And why do most case studies (Snyder and Borghard
2011; Trachtenberg 2012) suggest little connection
between the success of leader threats and the likeli-
hood of public sanction?
One answer could be that threats are only a subset
of the data needed for testing general audience-cost
models. For example, both Downes and Sechser (2012)
and Snyder and Borghard (2011) force a requirement
that overt threats have to be made in a crisis for
audience costs to attach to a bargaining position.
However, this misses a key point in much of the early
formal literature that assumed troop deployments,
mobilizations, and other costly signals were similar
to public threats and considered more credible when
made by democracies. Fearon explicitly states as much
when he writes, ‘‘Measures such as troop deployments
and public threats make crises public events in which
domestic audiences observe and assess the performance
of the leadership’’ (1994, 577). Democratic leaders
may be signaling their resolve with these actions rather
than their words, and, if so, this may account for the
empirical discrepancies currently in the audience-cost
literature.
A second answer may rest on the realization that
empirical tests of the audience-cost logic are always
conducted on a (strategically) selected sample of cases.
Schultz (2001b) was among the first to point this out.
Schultz argues that the strategic behavior theoretically
implied by audience costs would most likely cause
cases of sanctioned leaders to be unobserved empir-
ically. Because escalating a crisis and subsequently
backing down endangers political survival, a leader’s
strategic incentives dictate that she purposely avoid
situations in which audience costs would be highest.
Observed outcomes then represent a censored sample
because leaders will only choose to engage in situations
with lower audience costs and, hence, a reduced risk
of removal. Therefore, the mean of observed audience
costs is systematically different from the mean of the
population of audience costs, the vast majority of
which remain unobserved. If Schultz’s logic is correct,
then the leader threats identified by Downes and
Sechser (2012) may actually be cases in which domes-
tic sanctions were not likely; threats that were never
made because of potential audience costs never get
into the data sample. Schultz (2012) makes a similar
argument in his response to the recent critiques in
Trachtenberg (2012), Downes and Sechser (2012),
and Snyder and Borghard (2011).
Nevertheless, we find a third answer most com-
pelling. In the next section, we outline an argument
that suggests explanations of audience costs need to
consider more seriously the importance of domestic
issue salience in their explanations. Salient issues tend
to be reciprocated by rivals, while issues that are not
salient to the public provide little risk of political
sanction for the leader. As we describe, the implica-
tions of this observation are far-reaching for theories
dependent upon the signaling power of democracies,
especially those related to the democratic peace.
Issue Salience, Territory, and
Audience Costs
Building on recent theories of state development, we
argue that democracies, as territorially mature states,
rest sheltered from the threats that will most consis-
tently be salient to their publics. This freedom from
constraints benefits democratic leaders since, without
nearby rivals, they can choose when best to involve
themselves in foreign crises, picking easier victories
and conflicts in which opponents either do not re-
ciprocate or back down quickly. Of course, this freedom
from territorial conflict also implies that most citizens
will rarely care much about international bargaining,
so democratic leaders will not have an audience-cost
advantage when they are forced to engage over issues
that are not of their choosing. Thus, the correlation
between democracies and nonterritorial issues best
explains both the tendency of democratic leaders not
to have their disputes reciprocated and the ineffec-
tiveness of their overt threats during crises.
We develop the logic here by first discussing the
many studies that demonstrate the salience of terri-
torial issues and their association with democratic
development. We then explain how extant findings in
the audience-cost literature can be understood as a
function of territorial issue salience, also suggesting
novel empirical tests of our argument using existing
studies. Finally, we extend our theory to within-dispute
bargaining, arguing that this environment provides
perhaps the best evidence for assessing whether
international behavior is affected by audience
costs.
Territory, Issue Salience, and Regime Type
Slantchev (2006) argues that citizens need to know
the content of foreign policy positions in order for
the leader to generate domestic costs. We believe that
citizens also need to care. Not all foreign policies will
be salient to the public since crises vary so widely in
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their importance to the average individual. Most sei-
zures of ships or goods by foreign powers, for example,
matter little to the average individual who is unaffected
by the outcome of the crisis. Contrast these cases,
however, with any threat of occupation or destruction
of homeland territories. While rarer, these are the issues
that will galvanize public opinion in the threatened
state. Leader pronouncements will be watched closely
by the public, and there will be less room available for
the leader to maneuver during the crisis. These are the
constrained leaders expected by the theories that de-
pend on domestic accountability.3
There is good evidence that territorial issues may
be one of the most consistently salient issues to do-
mestic populations. Among the issue classifications
used by the Correlates of War datasets, territorial issues
end in war significantly more often than disputes over
regime type, policy, or any other issue (Senese and
Vasquez 2008; Vasquez 1993, 1995, 2001, 2009; Vasquez
and Henehan 2001). Vasquez and Henehan (2001), for
example, find that over 50% of all wars (53 of 97 in
their dataset) are fought over territorial issues. This
confirms an earlier study by Holsti which found that
79% or more of the wars since 1648 have been fought
over territory or territory-related issues (Holsti 1991).
The results are not limited to wars either. Compared to
other issue types, territorial disputes also generally
have higher fatalities (Senese 1996), are more difficult
to resolve, and are more likely to recur (Hensel 1998).
Together, these results confirm a higher rate of conflict
for territorial issues which implies higher salience for
the countries affected by these issues.
From the perspective of the individual in a targeted
state, territorial issues often present a direct threat to
their homes, lives, and livelihoods (Gibler 2012). Land
provides shelter in less-developed countries and often
constitutes one’s greatest asset in more advanced
countries. Thus, targeting the land with occupation
implies a threat to both shelter and economic well-
being. Of course, territory also holds more than eco-
nomic value for most individuals. As Vasquez (1995)
describes, most individuals have strong attachments
to their homes and birthplaces. This attachment is often
encouraged by groups within society who socialize the
individual with myths and legends, signs and symbols,
education, and religion that all equate particular lands
with ethnic and national groups, and group socializa-
tion reaffirms that threats to territory will be equated
with threats to the population. Individuals’ sensitivity to
land pulls public opinion in territorially threatened
states towards centralization. These citizens are often
nationalistic (Gibler, Hutchison, and Miller 2012),
intolerant of minority groups (Hutchison and Gibler
2007), and unsupportive of dissent or opposition to
the leadership (Hutchison 2011). These changes in
public opinion confirm the higher salience of territo-
rial threats already assumed by the strong relationship
between territorial issues and conflict.
Gibler (2012) argues that these domestic responses
also encourage institutional centralization within the
state. In crises over issues that are highly salient to the
public, opposition parties are often constrained by
the changes in public opinion to support the leader—to
do otherwise would risk their parties being labeled
as traitorous—and open political dissent decreases.
Territorial issues also encourage a militarized state, with
a military comprised mostly of a large army to defend
the land. The presence of this army further biases nego-
tiations in favor of the leader since domestic opposition
will begin to fear repression.4 Given this new domestic
political environment, the leader has strong incentives
to remove the veto players that could pose as threats to
the executive’s policies, and, with these veto players re-
moved, a centralized state emerges. Since democracy is
built on foundations of distributed domestic power and
tolerant publics, it follows that the removal of territorial
threats encourages demilitarization within the state, the
decentralization of power, and the emergence of de-
mocracy (also, see Gibler and Tir 2010), assuming the
necessary wealth and income prerequisites are present
in the state. One implication of this state-development
argument, then, is that there will be a correlation be-
tween nondemocracies and territorial issues and, con-
versely, between democracies and nonterritorial issues.
In short, democracies will rarely contend over the issue
that is most consistently salient to domestic populations.
Still, one need not go so far as to argue that ter-
ritorial issues cause regime changes to note that the
types of issues facing democratic leaders are system-
atically different from those facing other regime types.
Studies of democratization have generally associated
democracy with peaceful regional environments that
3See also Slantchev’s argument regarding salience: ‘‘[a]udience
costs are more likely to matter only for salient policies of great
national importance’’ (2006, 469).
4There is much evidence suggesting that opposition parties are
substantially weakened by external threats to the state. Schultz, for
example, found that ‘‘domestic opposition to a deterrent threat is
relatively rare; we observe it in only five of the thirty-one cases in
which democratic states made retaliatory threats’’ (2001a, 1687).
The rate is even higher in territorial disputes. As Gibler (2010)
demonstrates, since 1960 only two of 82 nondemocracies had
oppositions that broke from the leadership during territorial dis-
putes; when democracies are targeted by territorial disputes (a rare
event), the opposition supports the leadership 71% of the time
(24 of 34 cases).
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have few territorial changes (Gleditsch 2002; Gleditsch
and Ward 2006), and ample evidence suggests their
issues more likely concern low-salience disputes over
trade, fishing rights, and the like (Kalbhenn 2011).
Indeed, in an important piece of investigative research,
Mitchell and Prins (1999) find that most militarized
disputes between democracies involve ‘‘fishing stocks,
maritime boundaries, and resources of the sea’’
(1999, 179). Very rarely do mature democracies fight
over territorial issues that are likely to be salient to the
average citizen. In fact, only two of the 23 disputes
between full democracies in the Mitchell and Prins
study involved territory, and none of the fully dem-
ocratic dyads fought over territory in the pre-World
War II sample.
Reexamining Previous Studies
Recall that the empirical literature suggests two seem-
ingly contradictory conclusions: threats made by dem-
ocratic leaders are not more effective than threats made
by other leaders, but the disputes they initiate are rarely
reciprocated. Here, we explain how these results make
better sense given the relationship between territorial
issues and regime type.
The Threats Democratic Leaders Make.
Democracies rarely, if ever, fight over territory. This
matters because issue salience is important for many
or most theories of democratic signaling. Clare (2007),
for example, argues that the payoffs in any crisis are at
least partially a function of the worth of the contested
good, so backing down over nonvital issues will have
little effect on the tenure of the leader. The public will
not care. In crises involving at least one major power,
Clare (2007) finds that the democratic bargaining ad-
vantage is limited to only issues that are vital to the
strategic interests of the state, which are defined as
an index of the major power’s regional interests
(alliance ties, colonial possessions, and diplomatic
missions). When stakes are vital, democratic challenges
are reciprocated less often, and democracies back down
from their initial challenges less often.
Without an interested public, there is no electoral
check on either the opposition or the leadership, and,
without this bargaining leverage, there are no in-
formational advantages for democratic governments
(see, again, Snyder and Borghard 2011). This implies
that the correlation between less-salient/nonvital foreign
policy issues and democratic governments is incredibly
problematic for arguments that rely on bargaining
leverage from an informed public. Thus, while Clare
(2007) finds crises that do advantage democratic major
powers, we argue that these will be rare events, especially
when salience is defined in terms of territorial issues.
Democratic citizens enjoy safety from direct threats and
worry more about the economy, taxes, and their pros-
pects for the future. Citizens in democracies will have
little reason to sanction either leadership or opposition
for their foreign policy positions, which makes demo-
cratic behavior uninformative.5
One way of assessing this explanation is by taking
a closer look at some of the threat data provided by
Downes and Sechser (2012). Their online appendix
provides a useful recoding of the Correlates of War
MID narrative data, 1993–2001, that identifies whether
a coercive threat took place during a dispute. This has
been the principle dataset used in the audience-cost
literature, and they find, with their recoding, that the
vast majority of these dispute cases never contained
deterrent or compellent threats. Indeed, out of 319
narratives, Downes and Sechser identify only 30 cases
(9.4%) in which a deterrent or compellent threat was
made; democracies were involved in two-thirds of
these threat cases (this is based on our examination of
their appendix Table 1).6 The majority of these cases
(17 in all) had large democracies, such as the United
States, issuing threats to far-flung nondemocracies.
Another eight cases involved contiguous nondemocra-
cies, and two more cases involved noncontiguous non-
democracies. Supporting our theory of the relationship
between territory and (non-)democracy, there were only
three cases in which threats were made in disputes that
involved a democracy and at least one contiguous state.7
The full sample of Sechser’s (2011) Militarized
Compellent Threats Dataset (MCT) tells a similar story.
Eighty-two of 242 challenges (34%) were initiated by
a democratic state. However, only nine of those threats
were over territory and between contiguous states, and
just seven of those nine were coded as the democracy
being the primary challenger in the threat episode. Once
again, democracies seldom have disputes over their
5Our argument also suggests that Clare’s (2007) findings may be
better understood as a function of leader interests rather than
the effects of citizen-based audience costs. We argue that citizens
care most about threats to their own homeland territories and are
less likely to be politically engaged when leaders involve the state in
far-flung conflicts.
6Downes and Sechser (2012) use the Correlates of War ‘‘side A’’
and ‘‘side B’’ classifications but do not distinguish which state
(or both) issued a deterrent/compellent threat during the conflict.
Their online appendix is available at http://faculty.virginia.edu/
tsechser/Downes-Sechser-IO-2012-Appendices.pdf. For our dis-
cussion, we added two variables to the dataset: whether the threat
initiator was democratic (using Polity IV data, 6 and above) and
whether the states involved in the threat were contiguous.
7These are MID#’s 4040 (Turkey and Greece), 4277 (Pakistan and
India), and 4291 (Turkey and Syria).
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homeland territories, and here is evidence that very few
threats over contiguous territory are ever made—only
3.7% of all threats in the MCT data and less than 1% of
the MID data from 1991 to 2003.
The lack of territorial threats made by democracies
provides at least indirect evidence for why their threats
may not be more effective than those made by other
types of states. Threats over issues that are not salient
to the public will seldom carry an audience-cost ad-
vantage. However, this is still indirect evidence, of
course, and the salience of territory is likely to cut both
ways. Control of land is zero-sum, so the salience of
the issue for one state will often be mirrored in the
other state, making informative demonstrations of
resolve difficult to decipher. Dispute reciprocation
demonstrates this well.
Democracies and Dispute Reciprocation. Most
large-N tests of the audience-cost logic rely on dispute
reciprocation as the dependent variable (see, for exam-
ple, Schultz 2001a; Weeks 2008). In these studies, the
failure to reciprocate is evidence of a successful signal of
resolve by the initiator and denotes credible signaling by
the initiator. If our argument is correct, however, this
approach is problematic unless there are also controls
for whether the dispute initiation involved homeland
territories. First, it is likely that many disputes are re-
ciprocated not because the threats are incredible; rather,
territorial threats are so salient to targeted publics that
they require dispute reciprocation from their leaders.
Failure to respond to even a credible threat to territory
poses too many risks for the regime of the threatened
state. Second, if democracies are removed from these
threats to homeland territories, their leaders will be
better able to choose which disputes to escalate (Gibler
and Miller 2013). They need not fear their neighbors,
can engage abroad as they wish, and, if their leaders are
smart, will be predisposed to choosing disputes that
can be easily won or unlikely to be reciprocated. The
remaining sample of nonterritorial disputes will have
many fewer reciprocations, and the democratic ad-
vantage results from the correlation of democracy
with nonterritorial disputes. Together, the salience and
distribution of territorial disputes are likely to over-
whelm empirical tests of the audience-cost logic.
To test this argument, we use the same research
design as several previous studies (Downes and
Sechser 2012; Schultz 2001a; Weeks 2008). We first
constructed a sample of all directed-dyad MID initi-
ations from 1816 to 2001. Our regime identifications
are dichotomous—democracy or nondemocracy—and
are again based on the Polity IV combined democracy-
autocracy scale (Marshall et al. 2002). We code de-
mocracies as those states scoring 7 or above on this
21-point scale.8 We include dummy variables for the
presence of democracy in the (1) initiator, (2) challenger,
TABLE 1 The Probability of Dispute
Reciprocation, 1816–2001
Variable
Initiator is democracy -0.293*
(0.144)
-0.251
(0.157)
-0.433*
(0.185)
Target is democracy -0.060
(0.134)
0.109
(0.149)
0.120
(0.147)
Both states are
democracies
-0.254
(0.284)
-0.423
(0.306)
-0.466
(0.312)
Major versus major -0.000
(0.226)
0.010
(0.246)
0.008
(0.246)
Major versus minor 0.122
(0.169)
0.228
(0.185)
0.228
(0.184)
minor versus major 0.255
(0.203)
0.420†
(0.219)
0.412†
(0.220)
Initiator’s share of
capabilities
-0.288
(0.200)
-0.295
(0.227)
-0.305
(0.227)
Contiguous 0.830***
(0.118)
0.709***
(0.128)
0.704***
(0.127)
Alliance portfolio
similarity
-0.106
(0.176)
-0.104
(0.195)
-0.121
(0.196)
Status quo evaluation
of initiator
0.214
(0.252)
0.412
(0.278)
0.494†
(0.281)
Status quo evaluation
of target
-0.345
(0.241)
-0.226
(0.262)
-0.298
(0.265)
Territory 0.883***
(0.154)
0.977***
(0.176)
0.813***
(0.189)
Democratic initiator
X territory
0.612*
(0.286)
Policy -0.519***
(0.141)
-0.317*
(0.160)
-0.310†
(0.161)
Regime 0.805***
(0.238)
0.824**
(0.273)
0.822**
(0.274)
Other -0.495†
(0.280)
-0.258
(0.304)
-0.256
(0.305)
Highest action:
occupation
-0.638**
(0.237)
-0.587*
(0.233)
Highest action:
clash
3.962***
(0.367)
3.966***
(0.368)
Highest action:
seizure
-0.426**
(0.165)
-0.435**
(0.165)
Constant -0.220
(0.240)
-0.794**
(0.281)
-0.740**
(0.280)
N 2,325 2,325 2,325
Note: Logistic regression of dispute reciprocation, robust stan-
dard errors clustered on directed dyad. †p , 0.10, *p , 0.05,
**p , 0.01, ***p , 0.001.
8Analyses using 6 and above for democracy are substantively the
same as those presented here; we report 7 and above for consistency
with previous studies.
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and (3) both initiator and challenger. Again, this con-
struction is exactly the same as Schultz’s (2001a, 146)
dispute-reciprocation model, which was also incorpo-
rated into tests by Weeks (2008) and Downes and
Sechser (2012).
Our capability controls are also similar to Schultz’s
model. We include dummy variables for the presence
of a (1) major state challenging another major state,
(2) a major state versus a minor state, and (3) a minor
state challenging a major state. We also control for the
total share of dyadic capabilities held by the challenger
(Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972). We include controls
for contiguity (Stinnett et al. 2002) and alliance portfolio
similarity (1) in the dyad, (2) between the challenger
and the hegemon, and (3) between the target and the
hegemon (Gibler and Sarkees 2004). The last two
variables have been used to approximate state status
quo evaluations.
We improve upon previous studies of dispute
reciprocation by also controlling for the highest level
of action in the dispute. As we detail in the online
appendix associated with this piece, certain types of
actions are always reciprocated, regardless of the regime
type of the initiator. This is true for clashes, which are
reciprocated by coding-rule definition, and also for wars.
Few states will fail to respond to another state that has
killed 1,000 or more of its citizens. These cases become
tautological for models estimating dispute reciprocation.
A different methodological problem occurs with
occupations. Occupations often occur when the target
is either not aware of the territorial grab or not able to
respond to the challenger. For example, Italy occupied
some French lands in 1940, when the French were
trying to defend against the German attack. In these
cases the ability to reciprocate is constrained by
the lack of information or ability to respond. We in-
clude dummy variables for these highest occupation
codes in several of the analyses; again, for more detailed
discussions of our rationale, please see the online
appendix.
Finally, we code issue type using Correlates of
War definitions—territory, policy, regime, or other.
We code each issue as positive if either the challenger
or the target has the issue as their first revision
type. The omitted category for the analyses is ‘‘not
applicable.’’
Table 1 presents the results of our first set of tests.
We use the entire sample of all MID initiations, but,
consistent with earlier studies (Schultz 2001a; Weeks
2008), we omit the disputes that occur during the
world wars. In Model 1, we estimate a base model
without controls for the level of hostility used by the
challenger. When issues are not considered, democratic
challengers seem to have an audience-cost advantage
since their dispute initiations do not seem to be recip-
rocated. Among the control variables, disputes between
contiguous states and the presence of territorial or
regime issues are all more likely to generate reciproca-
tion by the targeted state. Policy disputes are less likely
to be reciprocated. Overall, the results of this model are
entirely consistent with the findings of Schultz (2001a)
and Weeks (2008).
In Model 2, we include dummy variables for those
actions that are most likely to control reciprocation,
regardless of regime or issue type. These actions include
occupations, clashes, and seizures, though we exclude
wars since our model would not converge if we in-
cluded this variables—all wars are, in fact, reciprocated.
Our results confirm our prior expectations: clashes have
a high likelihood of being reciprocated while occupa-
tions and seizures do not. In these cases, the highest
level of action does control the likelihood of a response,
even after controlling for regime type and disputed
issue.
Model 2 also suggests that inferences regarding
regime-type change as we add controls for the highest
level of action used by the challenger. Democratic
challengers no longer have a signaling advantage in
this model. While the coefficient remains negative, it
is no longer statistically significant at any conventional
level. Nevertheless, contiguity and the issue-type varia-
bles do remain as before—contiguous disputes are more
likely to be reciprocated as are territorial and regime
disputes; policy disputes are again unlikely to be
countered. Since clashes, wars, and occupations all
have a higher probability of involving territorial
issues, and seldom involve democracies, this pro-
vides preliminary evidence for our argument regarding
a selection effect in the distribution of disputes by
regime type.
Recall that our primary expectation is that de-
mocracies are unlikely to be involved in territorial
disputes and that this will lead to incorrect conclusions
regarding the role of regime type during challenges.
We test this expectation in Model 3 by adding a simple
interaction term that is positive for democratic chal-
lenges over territorial issues. The estimates of all our
control variables remain as before in Model 3. Indeed,
the only real changes are found in the regime variables.
The addition of the interaction term changes the effect
of democratic challenges, which is now once again
negative and statistically significant. Territorial issues
also remain likely to provoke reciprocation. More im-
portantly, the interaction term of democratic challengers
initiating territorial challenges is positive and statistically
significant, suggesting that any audience-cost advantage
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inherent indemocracy is overwhelmedby the importance
of territorial issues to the publics involved.
We believe the estimates in Model 3 provide
further evidence for the argument that any supposed
democratic signaling advantage results from the lack
of territorial issues confronting most democracies.
As is evident from the interaction coefficient, democra-
cies actually fare worse when issuing territorial chal-
lenges. When combined with the estimate for the base
term of democratic challengers, democracies have
no signaling advantage (or disadvantage) whatsoever
(see Model 2 as well). Instead, democracies are among
a set of states that are advantaged by being confronted
with relatively few territorial issues.
Extending the Argument
We have demonstrated well that our argument can
explain the empirical inconsistencies in the data.
However, in our review of the literature, we provided
two alternate hypotheses for why recent critics find
that democracies perform worse than expected when
issuing threats. Threats exclude the use of costly ma-
neuvering (troop deployments and other forms of
militarization) during bargaining; the issuance of a
threat is also likely to follow a long process of strategic
selection such that the final, observed sample is biased
toward noncompliance. We have also demonstrated
that tests of reciprocation are prone to specification
error due to both the highest action of the conflict and
the salience of the issue. Together, these potential
problems may overwhelm any inferences we can draw
from democracies engaged in threats or dispute
initiations.
We therefore use this section to specify tests on
a new sample of cases: the bargaining that takes place
within disputes. The third iteration of the MID data-
collection project provides the incident-level data for
each dispute, 1993 to 2001. These incidents are the
events that comprise a dispute—from the first threat
of force to the final event in the dyadic dispute. Thus,
they provide us the opportunity to examine for the
first time the escalation (or deescalation) within a dis-
pute as it progresses. These are not necessarily deterrent
or compellent threats since militarized incidents may
often be made without public pronouncement. How-
ever, these incidents also do not represent the summary
data from a dispute and can be used to evaluate dem-
ocratic state behavior as it interacts with other types of
regimes during conflict.
Importantly, there are strong prior expectations
in the audience-cost literature regarding what dem-
ocratic states will do during conflicts. These include
Fearon’s (1994, 585) predictions of when high-audience-
cost states will (1) back down, (2) engage in limited
probes, or (3) escalate their disputes. These predictions
present more difficult comparison hypotheses than null
findings for the expectations derived from our argu-
ment. Here, we describe Fearon’s predictions and follow
these with our own arguments for how issue salience
will drive within-dispute bargaining.
Fearon’s (1994, 585) first prediction is that higher-
audience-cost states are less likely to back down during
conflicts against authoritarian states.9 However, if the
conflict targets the homeland territories of the author-
itarian state, our argument would suggest that the
authoritarian leader would be unable or unwilling to
back down. The issue would be too salient to the leader’s
supporters. Further, as Weeks (2008) has pointed out,
certain types of autocracies have audiences—mostly
elites—who can punish their leaders for missteps in in-
ternational bargaining. These elite audiences are likely to
be smaller and better informed about foreign policy
issues than the audiences in democracies because their
stakes in these issues are higher. Elite-led systems will
also redistribute payoffs among fewer individuals, giving
each person more incentive to fight over their state’s
policy choices. Therefore, the leaders of these elites will
actually be more constrained by their audiences when
bargaining over nonterritorial issues or even far-flung
territories; democratic audiences will remain largely
apathetic over these outcomes. We expect then that,
H1: Democracies will be more likely than other states to
back down when challenging the homeland territories
of authoritarian states.
Fearon (1994, 585) also argues that democratic leaders
will be unlikely to use military force to conduct
‘‘limited probes’’ of adversaries. Their larger audience
costs leave them less room to make mistakes, and
challenging a rival could potentially escalate a dispute
and engage their public. Nevertheless, we have already
9Fearon: ‘‘Thus if actions such as mobilization generate greater
audience costs for democratic than for nondemocratic leaders,
we should find the democracies backing down significantly less
often in crises with authoritarian states’’ (1994, 585). Partell and
Palmer (1999) test this proposition using MID outcomes, and
they were especially struck by the relative infrequency of states
backing down. However, with backing down defined only as
yields by the target or victories by the challenger, dispute-based
coding of backing down may entirely miss the many cases of
states deescalating into a stalemate or compromise. The bargain-
ing process within a dispute is likely to include a series of steps,
and failed status quo challenges could provoke backing down so
that the challenger can draw a stalemate or negotiated compro-
mise. These are, of course, missed with end-of-dispute coding of
outcomes, as Partell and Palmer (1999, 393) note. This point is
consistent with Downes and Sechser’s (2012) critiques as well.
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demonstrated that the salience of territorial issues is
such that disputes initiated over homeland territories
are almost always reciprocated. Leaders will likely know
this and avoid territorial issues if their goal is only a
limited probe. This suggests that any empirical relation-
ship between fewer limited probes and regime type may
actually result from democracies having fewer territorial
issues affecting them. Democratic leaders do not engage
in fewer limited probes generally; rather, democratic
leaders have been selected out of the types of issues over
which few leaders will probe. In hypothesis form we
would expect that,
H2: Leaders will engage in fewer limited probes over
territorial issues, regardless of their regime type.
The final prediction of Fearon’s (1994) model that we
test concerns the number of escalatory steps in dis-
putes involving democracies. As Fearon (1994: 585-
586) notes: ‘‘When large audience costs are generated
by escalation, fewer escalatory steps are needed cred-
ibly to communicate one’s preferences . . . Thus crises
between democracies should see significantly fewer es-
calatory steps than crises between authoritarian states’’
(1994, 585–86). This argument again ignores the sa-
lience of the issue. Responses to territorial issues should
be different than responses to nonterritorial issues, so
much so that initiations over territory will provoke a
greater response. If true, this will conflate nonterritorial
issues with a need for initiators to take fewer escalatory
steps. Again, since democracies experience fewer terri-
torial issues, then these regimes will be correlated with
fewer escalatory moves within their conflicts, assuming
there are no controls present for issue type. This leads to
our last hypothesis:
H3: Leaders will experience a greater number of esca-
latory moves when fighting over territorial issues, regard-
less of regime type.
Note again that these expectations are derived from
the audience-cost literature for observed cases of conflict.
Thus, they are sheltered from potential biases derived
from strategic selection. The inclusion of other types of
coercive behavior, rather than just threats, also allows
a fairer test of the audience-cost argument. We use the
remainder of the article to test these expectations and
discuss the implications of the findings.
Within-Dispute Bargaining:
MID Incidents
To properly test the backing-down hypothesis, we
created a two-part dependent variable that identifies
the number of times a state deescalated their hostility
level during a dispute and the overall outcome of the
dispute. Hostility levels include (1) no militarized
action, (2) threat to use force, (3) display of force, (4)
use of force, and (5) war, and these are defined for
each incident within a dispute based upon the hostile
action that was taken. We define backing down in a
dispute as Partell and Palmer (1999) do—the pres-
ence of a victory by the target state or yield by the
challenger—but we also include cases of stalemate or
compromise that contained a deescalation of hostil-
ities by the challenger. These are cases of bargaining
in which the challenger backed down into a stalemate
or compromise with the targeted state.10
Our independent variables for these and subsequent
models remain largely the same, except for two changes.
While the dispute-reciprocation studies controlled for
the presence of joint democracy, Fearon (1994) had ex-
plicit predictions for cases in which the audience costs
of challenger and target diverged. Therefore, we no longer
include a dummy variable for disputes between democ-
racies and instead control for democratic challenges
against authoritarian states, with authoritarian states
defined as -7 or below on the Polity IV scale. We also
change the interaction term to assess the prediction
that regime type behaves consistently across issue
type.Wenow include a dummyvariable for democracy-
versus-autocracy challengesmade over territorial issues.
Finally, since our model is dichotomous—the presence
(or absence) of backing down in a dispute—we again
use logistic regression with standard errors clustered
by dispute to estimate the model.
We present two models in Table 2 to demonstrate
the effects of adding the interaction term for regime
predictions over territorial issues. Model 1, without
the interaction, seemingly confirms Fearon’s assump-
tion that democracies are unlikely to back down against
nondemocracies (p , .05). The strategic setting is in-
deed important as democratic challengers seem to have
no intrinsic likelihood of deescalating the dispute. This
is also true of the capability-based indicators since these
have no effect on the likelihood of a challenger backing
down. Challenges against democracies are actually
less likely to result in backing down, and that is true
10It is interesting to note that a large majority of deescalatory
moves occur in the disputes with a stalemate outcome. There
are 136 disputes in which the challenger acted in ways that
were less hostile than previous actions in the dispute; 104 of
these deescalated disputes ended in stalemates. The five categories of
victory (side A or B), yield (side A or B), and compromise only had
18 deescalations combined. Almost 60% of the deescalations ending
in stalemate (58 of 104) concerned territorial issues while the re-
maining cases were equally split across other four issue categories.
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regardless of what type of regime is challenging them.
These estimates are found while also controlling for
contiguity and disputed issue type, each of which is
associated (to varying degrees) with an increased
probability of the challenger backing down. There
may also be some systemic influences in the model
since similarity with the system leader increases the
likelihood that the challenger will back down.
Model 2 introduces the interaction term of dem-
ocratic challenges to autocracies over territorial issues,
and this variable is positive and statistically significant
(p , 0.04). This suggests that democracies are
actually more likely to back down when confronting
nondemocracies over territorial issues. Of the 369
cases of dispute in our sample, there are only 17 in-
stances of democracies challenging autocracies over
territorial issues, and the democracy backs down in
12 of those cases. The relationship between de-
mocracy and backing down over territory seems to
be strong enough, though few in total, to dilute the
base coefficient of democracy versus autocracy, since
the added control now makes these challenges sub-
stantively stronger.11
Not reported here are tests we conducted on the
ability of challengers to force backing down by the
targeted state. We estimated the exact same models as
above in Table 2, but we changed the dependent var-
iable to whether the target backed down. Regime-type
dummies had no statistically significant effect in
either model. Only contiguity (negative) and three
issue variables—territory, policy, and regime (all positive
for an increased likelihood of backing down)—were
statistically significant in each model. In short, we find
no evidence that challenges against democracies are
more likely to be averted during a dispute. If there is
an audience-cost advantage for democracies, it must
happen during conflict selection, at least for this sample.
Overall, these results demonstrate well that the
audience-cost advantage of democracies results from
an empirical association of democracies with nonterri-
torial disputes. Democracies are generally less likely to
back down against autocracies in public disputes over
nonterritorial issues, but, when involved in territorial
issues, democracies actually tend to deescalate their
hostilities, backing down from their original dispute
actions. We find no support for a democratic advantage
in high-salience disputes such as those over territory.
The incident data for the 1993 to 2001 disputes
also allows a straightforward test of the limited probe
proposition. To do this, we created a dichotomous
variable for the presence of a limited probe by the
challenger in which only one incident was initiated by
the challenger during the dispute.12 Since Fearon’s
expectation seems to apply to all democracies, rather
than democracies challenging autocracies, we returned
our interaction dummy variable to the presence of a
democratic challenge over territory. Otherwise, our
TABLE 2 The Likelihood of Challengers Backing
Down, 1993–2001
Variable
Initiator is democracy 0.842
(0.619)
0.664
(0.597)
Target is democracy -0.882*
(0.433)
-0.939*
(0.426)
Democratic challenger
vs. authoritarian Target
-2.082*
(0.908)
-3.272*
(1.389)
Major versus major -0.113
(0.927)
-0.157
(0.980)
minor versus major -0.091
(0.643)
-0.382
(0.659)
Initiator’s share of
capabilities
-0.221
(0.484)
-0.174
(0.472)
Contiguous 0.601
(0.406)
0.737†
(0.417)
Alliance portfolio
similarity
-0.333
(0.679)
-0.759
(0.844)
Status quo evaluation
of initiator
3.541*
(1.424)
4.421*
(1.754)
Status quo evaluation
of target
-1.429
(1.479)
-1.908
(1.693)
Territory 4.918**
(1.565)
4.691**
(1.595)
Territory X dem challenge
of authoritarian target
2.920*
(1.393)
Policy 3.885*
(1.524)
4.022**
(1.558)
Regime 0.404
(0.889)
0.612
(0.857)
Other 3.018*
(1.451)
3.029*
(1.482)
Constant -5.574**
(1.967)
-5.411**
(1.984)
N 369 369
Note: Logistic regression predicting whether a challenger backs
down in a public dispute, robust standard errors clustered on di-
rected dyad. †p , 0.10, *p , 0.05, ***p , 0.01, ***p , 0.001.
11The coefficient increased by over 50% from Model 1 to Model 2.
Since the models are nonlinear, we confirmed that this increased
substantive effect was true using predicted probabilities. Holding
all other variables at the mean in both models, we found the
strength of the effect to increase by 72% with the addition of the
interaction term.
12Over 48% of the disputes (196 cases) have only one incident
made by the challenger. Seventy-three percent of disputes have
four or fewer incidents initiated by the challenger.
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models remain the same as before, and we present the
results predicting limited probes in Table 3 below.
Once again Model 1 of the model seemingly finds
support for the regime-based expectations of the
model. Democracies are unlikely to pursue limited
probes of their rivals (p , .07). Further, limited
probes are unlikely to target democracies. Differences
in regime type between challenger and target seem
not to matter. These conclusions change, though, with
the addition of the interaction term, which controls for
democratic challenges over territorial issues. Democratic
challenges over other issues are no longer statistically
significant at any conventional level, though challenges
of democracies do tend to last longer than one incident.
The only other effects consistent across both models
include issue type (territory and policy) and the system
similarity score of the target. Each of these variables
predict disputes containing more than one incident
initiated by the challenger.
The results of these models also provide confirma-
tion of our argument that the types of issues on the
agenda of democracies control the likelihood of ob-
serving audience-cost effects empirically. Democracies
behave as expected over nonterritorial issues, with lower
likelihoods of conducting limited probes. However,
when the disputed issue concerns territory, there seems
to be no regime-type advantage.
Finally, we use the incident data to provide em-
pirical leverage on the question of dispute escalation.
We created two dependent variables to measure threat
credibility. First, we totaled the number of incidents in
the dispute initiated by the challenger; we use the
natural logarithm of this measure since the event data
is highly skewed. Our assumption with this measure is
that challengers will need fewer threats in order to
convey their resolve. Our second dependent variable is
similar to the dependent variable used in the Eyerman
and Hart (1996) study. We use the hostility levels of
each incident to calculate the number of escalatory
moves by the challenger; each increase in hostility
level is an additional count for the dependent variable.
According to Fearon’s argument, democracies should
need fewer escalatory moves in order to signal their
intentions. Table 4 presents our findings.
Models 1 and 2 use the total number of incidents
as the dependent variable, and, as can be seen in the
table, there are few regime-based effects in either
model. More importantly, democratic challenges only
seem to matter over nonterritorial issues. In Model 1,
democratic challenges are not statistically significant
at any meaningful level; these challenges only have an
effect once the challenges over territory are specified
with the interaction term. In Model 2, democratic
challenges over territory are actually more likely to
have numerous incidents, which of course provides
additional support for our theory.13
To help confirm these findings on escalation, we
estimated Models 3 and 4 with the number of esca-
latory steps as the dependent variable. Since this sum
is a count variable, with variance greater than the mean,
we estimate the models using a negative binomial re-
gression, clustering the standard errors on the dispute.
Models 3 and 4 again demonstrate the importance of
TABLE 3 Predicting Limited Probes, 1993–2001
Variable
Initiator is democracy -1.191†
(0.644)
-1.170
(0.757)
Target is democracy 1.047**
(0.406)
1.050*
(0.412)
Democratic challenger
vs. authoritarian target
0.882
(0.605)
0.891
(0.601)
Major versus major 0.523
(0.574)
0.522
(0.574)
minor versus major 0.417
(0.550)
0.424
(0.559)
Initiator’s share of
capabilities
-0.547
(0.513)
-0.544
(0.510)
Contiguous 0.217
(0.423)
0.222
(0.415)
Alliance portfolio
similarity
0.944
(0.662)
0.948
(0.678)
Status quo evaluation
of initiator
2.197†
(1.332)
2.191
(1.349)
Status quo evaluation
of target
-2.726*
(1.127)
-2.708*
(1.098)
Territory -2.655**
(0.845)
-2.626**
(0.856)
Democratic initiator
X territory
-0.077
(0.693)
Policy -1.999*
(0.836)
-2.000*
(0.835)
Regime 0.029
(0.975)
0.031
(0.971)
Other -0.742
(0.841)
-0.740
(0.839)
Constant 1.535
(1.358)
1.507
(1.348)
N 369 369
Note: Logistic regression of a ‘‘limited probe’’ defined as 1-incident
challenge, robust standard errors clustered on directed dyad.
†p , 0.10, *p , 0.05, **p , 0.01, ***p , 0.001.
13We also added a dummy variable for the NATO versus Serbia
dispute, MID#4343. There are 37 dyadic relationships associated
with this MID, which makes it incredibly difficult to discern to
which state Serbia responds with its incidents.
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controlling for democratic challenges over territory. The
results from Model 3 seemingly confirm regime effects
for escalation—democracies are likely to escalate more
often against democracies and nonauthoritarian states
but much less often against authoritarian states. How-
ever, when Model 4 adds the interaction to predictions
of escalation, we find that democracies have more esca-
latory moves than average when their challenges are
against authoritarian states over territorial issues. This is
true after controlling for issue type in the general
model; territorial and policy issues tend to have more
escalatory moves on average. There are only minimal
substantive effects on the other variables in the model
due to the addition of the interaction term.
The consistency of the results using two separate
operationalizations of the dependent variable lends
added support to the argument that democracies do
not have an audience-cost advantage over territorial
TABLE 4 Predicting within Dispute Escalation, 1993–2001
Variable (# of Incidents) (# of Incidents) (Escalation) (Escalation)
Initiator is democracy -0.102
(0.257)
-0.157
(0.261)
1.305*
(0.560)
1.204*
(0.552)
Target is democracy -0.214
(0.195)
-0.217
(0.194)
-0.645
(0.451)
-0.628
(0.458)
Democratic challenger vs. authoritarian
target
-0.062
(0.262)
-0.301
(0.272)
-1.470*
(0.615)
-1.779**
(0.687)
Major versus major -0.174
(0.227)
-0.159
(0.228)
-0.734
(0.721)
-0.735
(0.721)
minor versus major -0.262
(0.223)
-0.334
(0.227)
0.119
(0.591)
-0.026
(0.587)
Initiator’s share of capabilities 0.330
(0.227)
0.346
(0.226)
0.245
(0.581)
0.287
(0.576)
Contiguous 0.083
(0.146)
0.109
(0.149)
0.782†
(0.423)
0.799†
(0.422)
Alliance portfolio similarity -0.585†
(0.335)
-0.631†
(0.340)
-0.547
(0.603)
-0.597
(0.619)
Status quo evaluation of initiator -0.228
(0.571)
-0.051
(0.539)
0.857
(0.797)
0.983
(0.793)
Status quo evaluation of target 0.473
(0.593)
0.383
(0.585)
-2.434*
(0.993)
-2.433*
(0.996)
Territory 1.141***
(0.231)
0.995***
(0.255)
3.619***
(0.692)
3.496***
(0.710)
Territory X dem challenge of
authoritarian target
0.891*
(0.415)
0.913†
(0.518)
Policy 0.695***
(0.204)
0.690**
(0.223)
2.815***
(0.658)
2.878***
(0.677)
Regime 0.330
(0.297)
0.360
(0.301)
0.953
(0.730)
1.010
(0.770)
Other 0.242
(0.236)
0.209
(0.251)
1.031
(0.649)
1.059
(0.657)
Constant 0.194
(0.459)
0.240
(0.480)
-2.857*
(1.116)
-2.864*
(1.138)
lnalpha
Constant 0.887*
(0.393)
0.865*
(0.392)
R-squared 0.588 0.598
N 369 369 369 369
Note: Ordinary least squares (OLS) is used in Models 1 and 2 to estimate the (natural log of the) number of incidents initiated by
the challenger. Negative binomial regression is used in Models 3 and 4 to estimate the number of escalations in hostility level by the
challenger. Omitted from the table is a dummy variable in each model that controls for the dyadic disputes of NATO versus Serbia
(see text). Standard errors are again clustered by dispute. † p , 0.10, *p , 0.05, **p , 0.01, ***p , 0.001.
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disputes. In our tests, democracies actually fare worse
than other types of regimes, needing more escalatory
steps and a greater number of incidents to signal their
intentions during disputes. In short, we find no
empirical advantage for democratic challengers in
any of our within-dispute estimates, and we confirm
a disadvantage in multiple situations.
Implications
We argue that democracies are unlikely to be in-
volved in the disputes that are typically salient to
their publics. We have ample evidence that territorial
issues are dangerous, involving more fatalities and
more wars than other issue types, and more salient
than other issues to domestic audiences. We also have
good evidence that democracies rarely face these types
of issues. Instead, democracies are more likely to be
involved in fishing disputes, policy concerns, and oc-
casional crises over distant regimes. These regularities
suggest, then, that foreign crises will seldom be salient
to democratic publics, and democratic leaders will
therefore have difficulties convincing other regimes
that they risk their tenure when backing down from
public threats. This is why previous studies have
found that democratic leaders perform poorly when
making threats during conflicts but still are able to choose
their targets well enough to seldom have challenges
reciprocated.
Our reexaminations of previous studies support
our argument. Democracies seldom make compellent
threats over homeland territorial issues and instead
have the bulk of their threats focused on nonterrito-
rial issues with noncontiguous states. As has been
convention in this literature, we also analyzed dispute
reciprocation patterns in the twentieth century and
found that targets are actually more likely to recipro-
cate all disputes over territorial issues but especially
those initiated by democratic challengers. Without this
interaction term, democratic challenges are generally
not reciprocated, so our estimates jointly imply that
the lack of reciprocation in previous studies is based
on the selected sample of conflicts facing democratic
leaders and, when bargaining over territory, their in-
itiations are reciprocated.
The selection effect we identify is problematic
for tests of audience costs. If conflict selection and
conflict escalation are correlated, such that democra-
cies have advantages in both processes, we should still
witness a higher rate of democratic effectiveness within
the revealed distribution of disputes. However, we
do not. Using incident-level data from 1993 to 2001,
we find that democracies are more likely to back
down, have a higher number of incidents, and have
more escalatory steps than other regimes, when they
are fighting territorial issues. Each of these findings
contradict the theorized advantage afforded democ-
racies and suggest that democracies do not bargain
well over high-salience issues in practice.
The implications of these findings are clear. We
know that democracies do not fight each other, but
there remains debate over why that is so. Audience costs
have traditionally been one of the best explanations for
the democratic peace and lead to expectations for why
democracies bargain well with other types of regimes
(Schultz 2012). However, critics of the audience-costs
mechanisms are right (Downes and Sechser 2012; Snyder
and Borghard 2011; Trachtenberg 2012). Democratic
leaders do not have an institutional advantage when
trying to back down the leaders of other regime types.
Of course, we go much further than this and explain
why there is still a democratic advantage when measur-
ing dispute reciprocation. Our findings confirm doubts
regarding the mechanisms of audience-cost logic and
suggest that any peace between democracies depends
critically on the distribution of issues that affect them.
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